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Florida on Trial:
Federalism in the 2000 Presidential Election

Jon L. Mills*

I. BACKGROUND
While the 2000 presidential election failed to inspire more than a tiny majority of citizens to visit the
polls on Election Day,1 the Florida recount provided drama that engaged the entire world and generated
instant and constant legal analysis.2 In the space of two months, the post-election period generated three
Florida Supreme Court cases and two U.S. Supreme Court cases, which will be studied and critically
analyzed for years to come? Our television sets broadcast images of the confused voters in Palm Beach
County who claimed that the "butterfly ballot" utilized during the 2000 election caused many of them to
mistakenly cast presidential votes for Reform Party candidate Pat Buchanan rather than Democratic Party
candidate Al Gore.4 Some of these frustrated voters took their grievances to the streets, while others
brought their grievances to the Florida courts.5

Dean and Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. B.A., Stetson University; J.D., University of
Florida. Mr. Mills was a member of the Florida House of Representatives from 1978 to 1988, where he served as Majority
Leader from 1986 to 1987 and as Speaker of the House from 1987 to 1988. The author wishes to thank Rocky Cabagnot for his
assistance in researching, writing, and editing this publication, and Doris Perron for her tireless patience and attention to detail.
1

Curtis Gans of the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate stated that turnout for the 2000 presidential election

was very low, drawing around 50.7 percent of eligible voters. Susan Schmidt & John Mintz, Voter Turnout Up Only Slightly
Despite BigDrive; BattlegroundStates HadMajor Gains, WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 2000, at A35.
2

The author was part of the instant legal analysis and appeared on television to comment on the recount controversy for PBS,

CNN, NPR and the BBC.
For a sampling of the recent scholarship, see Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 381
(2001); Theresa H. Hammond, JudicialJabberwocky in the PresidentialElection 2000: When Law and Facts Collide with
Politics, 52 MERCER L. Rsv. 1569 (2001); Gerald P. Moran, Bush v. Gore: A Renaissance ofLegal Realism, 2 FLA. COASTAL
L.J. 347 (2001); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law andPolitics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407 (2001);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable,76 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 1093 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, "In Such
Manner as the LegislatureThereofMay Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 613 (2001); Cass
R. Sunstein, Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. Ca. L. REv. 757 (2001).
3

4

See infraPart III.

5

Id.
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America watched intently as canvassing boards in three Florida counties searched for the correct
standards by which to divine the "intent of the voter" in a manual recount of the non-certified votes.6 The
events following the 2000 presidential election presented uncharted waters for lawyers and judges alike.'
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court brought closure to the electoral controversy by reversing the Florida
Supreme Court and stopping the Florida recount. 8 And, in the final chapter of this stage of the 2000
controversy, the state legislature enacted voluminous election reforms.'
Once it began, the electoral drama played out in a struggle involving Florida courts, Florida election
laws, the U.S. Supreme Court, principles of federalism, and the realities of politics. Federal law
ultimately proved dispositive. In response to controversy surrounding the 1876 presidential election,
Congress passed the Electoral Count Act,' ° which was intended to fix statutorily the meeting time of the
electors for the offices of President and Vice President." Enacted more than 100 years ago, the Electoral
Count Act's deadlines and requirements became central to the protest and contest litigation and
established the boundaries for the Florida conflict in 2000. This nineteenth-century federal law ultimately
was the central factor in the outcome of the election by posing issues of federal law decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
At first, the litigation turned on issues of Florida state election law. The Florida courts consistently
followed the intent of Florida law and case precedent in seeking the "intent of the voter" and to resolve
election controversies. The primary and actual causes of the recount fiasco were antiquated voting
machinery and ambiguous recount standards. In response, the legislative reforms of 2001 directly
addressed those issues and will probably prevent a replay of the 2000 Florida disaster, although they will
certainly not eliminate all possible problems.
This article analyzes how Florida's state election laws operated during the aftermath of the 2000
election. The intersection of law and politics in this controversy was critical. Political considerations
affected decisions in both the Bush and Gore camps. 12 The aftermath of the 2000 election found the

6

See infra Part IIIC.

See University of Florida Election Forum, Florida Election 2000: Insiders at the Intersection of Law, Politics and the Media
(Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Election Forum] (transcript of four panel discussions on file with Stanford Law & Policy Review).
7

8

See infra Part IIID.

9 See infra Part IV.
10 3 U.S.C.A §§ 5,6,15 (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 107-89) (no amendments since 2000). The 2000 election did
not mark the first time in U.S. history that the State of Florida and its electors were embroiled in a high-stakes presidential
conflict. Preceding the 1876 U.S. presidential election, the political landscape seemed favorable for the Democratic nominee,
Samuel Tilden, to defeat the Republican nominee, Rutherford B. Hayes. Tilden won the popular vote over Hayes by a margin of
fifty-one percent to forty-eight percent. The Electoral College count, however, showed Tilden one vote short of a majority with
Hayes trailing by twenty ballots. Florida, along with Louisiana, South Carolina and Oregon, became the epicenter of the election
dispute. In the three Southern states, both parties claimed voting fraud by the other party. The controversy made its way to the
U.S. Congress, where the parties argued over which body of the legislature would choose the President. On January 25, 1877,
months after the election, Congress passed the Electoral Commission Bill, establishing a bipartisan fifteen-member commission,
which issued a victory for Hayes by an eight-to-seven margin. HARPER'S WEEKLY, Finding Precedent:Hayes vs. Tilden-The
Electoral College Controversy of 1876-1877, available at http://www.elections.harpweek.com/9Controversy/overviewcontroversy-i.htm (last visited March 11, 2002).
11 William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairingthe ElectoralCollege, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 166 (1996).
12 For example, some counseled Gore to forego the protest phase of litigation, allow the election to be certified, and proceed
with a more judicially controlled contest. However, other Gore advisors feared that Bush's certification as the winner of
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federal government, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the State of Florida (among
others) commissioning task forces and committees to investigate and suggest election reforms.
Ultimately, the State of Florida passed significant election reform legislation.13 On May 10, 2001,
Florida enacted sweeping election reform legislation entitled the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001.14
This legislation overhauls and reforms many sections of Florida's election code and addresses reform of
voting equipment, ballot uniformity, and poll worker training.'5 Critics, including the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights, argue that the new legislation fails to address some of the critical issues of voter
disenfranchisement. 6
Most importantly, this article analyzes the events in Florida following the litigation that culminated
in Bush v. Gore 7--the aftermath and its consequences--and concludes that the state's new elections laws
will prohibit a future crisis of the kind seen in the 2000 presidential election. In Part II, this article sets
out the specific factors that caused Florida to become the epicenter of the 2000 election controversy. In
Part IlI, this article further describes the Florida perspective and the theory of "counting the votes" which
is derived from Florida case law and concludes that Bush v. Gore was correctly decided by the Florida
Supreme Court as a matter of Florida law. In Part IV, this article discusses the recent electoral reform
legislation enacted by the State of Florida, concluding that these changes will improve the election system
in Florida. Under these new reforms, there will never again be a "hanging chad" in Florida because
punch card ballots have been eliminated from further use in Florida elections. 8 Despite the anger and
confusion aroused by the electoral controversy in Florida, these struggles will ultimately, improve the
election process in the state of Florida and most likely the nation as a whole.
II.

THE STATE IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: WHY FLORIDA?
A series of circumstances dictated that Florida would become the center of the election maelstrom of

2000. First, the Florida election was a statistical dead heat between Bush and Gore. As several observers
put it, "The margin of error exceeded the margin of victory."' Second, the existence of flawed voting
machines across Florida provided a valid concern for accuracy and lost votes. For example, Alachua
County machines disqualified only 0.48 percent of presidential votes, whereas Duval County disqualified

Florida's electoral votes would make Gore appear to be a "sore loser." For a good look at the behind-the-scenes decisionmaking
in both the Bush and Gore camps, see the Washington Post front-page series published from January 28, 2001 through February
2, 2001.
13 See infra Part IV.
Brad Hahn, FloridaOverhauls Balloting; Governor Bush Signs Bill to Modernize, Cm. TRW., May 10, 2001, at 14; FLA.
STAT. ch. 2001-40.
"4

"s See infra Part IV.
16 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: EPILOGUE

(June 2001) (on file with Stanford Law & Policy Review). Moreover, Charles Major, Jr. and the Florida Voter League, Inc.
recently filed suit against Monroe County Elections Supervisor Harry L. Sawyer, Jr. and Florida Secretary of State Katherine
Harris, claiming that sections of the new reform statute could operate as an illegal return to "Jim Crow" laws. Alisa Ulferts,
Lawsuit: 'JimCrow' Taints Vote Law, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001.
17

531 U.S. 98 (2000).

1s See infra Part IV. For a discussion of "hanging chads" and other ballot problems, see notes 35-38 infra and accompanying
text
19 Election Forum, supra note 7 (remarks of Thorn Rumberger).
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over nine percent of presidential votes.2" Given these statistics, the statement that "the margin of error
exceeded the margin of victory" was credible. Third, Florida election laws, which included timeframes
and recount schedules, were not adequate for a dead heat presidential election.2' The Florida Supreme
Court concluded that the period of time for recounts during the protest phase was statutorily too short to
allow the ballots in larger counties to be recounted.22 Observers of this election with a background in
Florida election law believed these laws were not designed for presidential elections, but rather state and
local elections.23 As this was a presidential election, legal disputes needed to be resolved before
December 12, 2000, because of the existence of 3 U.S.C. § 5.2 This federally-specified date affected
Florida election law and the pace of the dispute in Florida.
If any one of these circumstances2" had not existed at the time of the 2000 U.S. presidential election,
Florida probably would not have been put "on trial."
III. THEORY OF FLORIDA ELECTION LAWS BEFORE BUSH V. GORE: "WILL OF THE
VOTER"
The circumstances discussed above centered the controversy in Florida and Florida courts. The
threshold issue was what law and precedent the Florida courts would employ to resolve these issues. The
Florida Constitution explicitly states that the right to vote is fundamental and that "all political power is
inherent in the people."26 In election controversies, the theory articulated in Beckstrom v. Volusia County
Canvassing Board7 and prior Florida Supreme Court cases2" supports a general commitment to
determining the "will of the voter."

20

Sydney P. Freedberg, Many Counties HadImperfect Election Night, Series: Election 2000, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 1,

2000, at 1A; Sally Kestin et al., The Disenfi-anchisedPoor, UneducatedRejected Most in 2000 Election, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
Nov. 18, 2001, at IF (showing ballots were spoiled more often in precincts that were black, poor, less-educated and
Democratic).
21

Contra Richard K. Scher, Grasping at Straws, Rushing to Judgment: Election Reforms in Florida,2001, 13 U. FLA. J.L. &

PUB. POL'Y 81 (forthcoming 2002) (on file with Stanford Law & Policy Review) (arguing that Florida election law would have

worked fine but for the interference of lawyers, judges, and politics).
22

See infra Part IIIC.

23

Election Forum, supra note 7 (remarks of CNN's David E.Cardwell).

24

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (discussing the safe harbor established by 3 U.S.C. § 5).

Professor Scher further argues that multiple minor party candidates, twelve in all, gained around 137,000 votes, many of
which would have gone to either Bush or Gore, but for the presence of these candidates on the ballot. Supra note 21 at 87-88.
For example, 3,226 of Green Party candidate Ralph Nader's votes in Florida came from Alachua County; yet as of April 20,
2001, Alachua County only had 247 registered Green Party members. Id. at 88.
25

§ 1.

26

FLA. CONST. art. I,

27

707 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 1998) (noting that a court can void a contested election even in the absence of fraud or intentional

wrongdoing if there is reasonable doubt that the election did not express the will of the voters).
28

See Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 269 (Fla. 1975) (observing that, concerning the contest of an election, real parties

in interest are voters); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 (Fla. 1940) (noting that in construing statutes relating to
elections, courts should give a liberal construction in favor of the citizen whose right to vote they tend to restrict).
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This philosophy is based on democratic principles, repeated in the first Harris case, and seeks to
allow participation where ballots may be flawed but are not illegal or fraudulent.29 For example, absentee
ballots that were clearly illegal were discarded in 'the 1996 Miami mayoral election.30 Moreover,
discarding corrupt or illegal ballots is also consistent with views of other states concerning election
recounts.3
The questions of election law prior to Bush v. Gore were: What were the "legal" votes that should
be counted? What were illegal votes that should not be counted? Vice President Gore's attorneys
emphasized the need to count the legal votes.32 The Bush attorneys' response was that the votes had been
counted twice. 33 Is a vote legal if a voter fails to follow instructions? It depends on the standard used to
determine intent. To illustrate, a voter in Gadsden County marked a paper ballot for Gore and also wrote
' The intent is clear, but so is the fact the voter failed to follow instructions.
in "Al Gore."34
The more difficult question, which was ultimately at the center of the controversy, was how to
evaluate a ballot that appears ambiguous as-to the intent of the voter. America became familiar with
' which constituted the critical
election ballot
lingo, such as "hanging chads ' '35 and "dimpled chads,"36
'
"undervotes."37
Undervotes were critical because these votes were the target of the manual recount
' in which the voter indicated more than one preference for an office, were
drives. "Overvotes,"38
unambiguously illegal and were not counted.39 The voters who "overvoted" on a machine ballot may
have been mistaken, but their intent was not clear so their votes could not count as legal votes.

29 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000) ("It is the intention of the law to obtain an

honest expression of the will or desire of the voter.").
30 In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots, 707 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that despite the

massive absentee voter fraud, the legally appropriate remedy is to invalidate all absentee ballots and not to call a new election).
31

See, e.g., Rogers v. Holder, 636 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1994) (holding that invalidation of all absentee ballots is improper if only

twelve absentee ballots are corrupt).
32

David Von Drehle et al., In Florida,Drawing The Battle Lines; Big Guns Assembled as Recount Began, WASH. POST., Jan.

29, 2001, at Al.
33

Id.

34 Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Election Hopes Dashed: Illiteracy, Confusion are Blamed for Gadsden's Ballot Trouble, ILAMI
HERALD, Dec. 3, 2000, at 33A.
35 A chad is a small piece of a puncheard ballot that should detach from the ballot when punched with a stylus by a voter. A

hanging chad is a chad that has only detached from three corners and thus "hangs" from the ballot.
36

A dimpled chad is a chad that shows some evidence of indentation but has not detached from the ballot.

37 An undervoted ballot is one on which the voter did not choose a candidate for president (according to the machine reading

the ballot).
38 An overvote is a ballot on which the voter chose more than one candidate for president.

The Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court has implied that the courts should have addressed the arguments of those
who felt certain "overvotes" could be counted. Gore v. Harris; 772 So. 2d 1243, 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). Those who
advocated counting "overvotes" in some instances had argued the intent of the voter could be discerned where a ballot contained
a cleanly punched hole for one candidate and a hanging chad for the other candidate.
39
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We should note that "wrong votes" generally have no remedy.4" This issue was raised by the
"butterfly ballot" controversy, which arose when voters stated that they had voted for Pat Buchanan but
had intended to vote for Al Gore. The "overvoter," the person who voted twice for the same office, is
analytically like the mistaken voter. The physical ballot cannot reveal the intent to vote for a particular
person.
Hence, the litigation in Florida ultimately focused on "undervotes." The "undervote" may, in some
cases, have had some actual indication of the intent of the voter on the physical ballot. Therefore, some
direct evidence of the intent of the voter still existed on such ballots. The question of law in the Bush
litigation was exactly what standard should be utilized to determine such intent. The arguments regarding
determination of the voter's intent ranged from physical to metaphysical. Because of the physical
deficiencies of the punch card ballot, i.e. "hanging chads" and "dimpled chads," physical evidence of the
"intent of the voter" was ambiguous and susceptible to different interpretations by canvassing officials in
conjunction with different standards set by local election boards. In fact, different standards were used in
the recounts of different counties.
At the time, there were no defined statutory standards for a recount other than the Florida statutory
standard of "intent of the voter," the same standard utilized in other states.4 This is the problem that
ultimately proved insoluble in Bush v. Gore and was remedied by the Florida Legislature through the
2001 reforms discussed in Part IV. Bush v. Gore ultimately held that different standards in different
counties for conducting recounts were inherently unfair, a violation of equal protection under the law.42
A colleague of mine has made the analogy that using different county standards in counting ballots is like
using different standards for grading a multiple-choice test for two different classes.
Although it culminated in a U.S. Supreme Court decision, many observers believed at the outset that
the legal issues raised by the Florida election controversy would be resolved in the Florida Supreme Court
and not in federal courts. Some also felt the controversy would be over in a few days.43 The post-election
litigation in Florida can be divided into four categories, of which only the latter two were based on a
theory that "undervotes" should be counted: (1) "butterfly ballot" litigation; (2) absentee ballot litigation;
(3) protest litigation (culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court decision Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing
Board);44 and (4) contest litigation (culminating in Bush v. Gore).
A. BUTTERFLY BALLOT LITIGATION: No LEGAL REMEDY FOR MISTAKEN VOTES
Fladell v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard,45 the first state lawsuit challenging Palm Beach's
"butterfly ballot," was filed on November 8, 2000. Other similar cases were filed in the following

40 Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs who claimed the butterfly

ballot was confusing and caused them to vote wrongly were not entitled to revote).
41 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 124 n.2 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing many states' use of the "intent of the voter"

standard as commonplace).
42

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (holding that Bush's equal protection argument reached the level of constitutional injury); see

Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that Bush's equal protection argument did not reach the
level of constitutional injury).
43 Election Forum, supra note 7 (remarks of David Boies).
44 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
45 No. CL 00-10965 AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000).
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weeks,46 many of which were consolidated. 47 At issue was the "butterfly ballot" used in precincts in Palm
Beach County. The ballot consisted of two leaves in book form, with the "chad" to be punched out from
the center.
Despite the fact that data showed that it was highly probable that many voters mistakenly voted for
Pat Buchanan, the trial court held that there was no remedy at law for such voters.48 Even if the ballot
was flawed, no remedy existed to reallocate secret ballots. Moreover, the trial court found federal law to
prohibit holding a new election.49 In Florida, unless the mistaken votes are the result of a legally flawed
ballot in substantial noncompliance with the law, there can be no remedy. Hence, the first case of the
controversy reached an unsatisfying and frustrating conclusion for many voters.
B. ABSENTEE BALLOT LITIGATION: "SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE" WITH FLORIDA LAW
Two types of absentee ballot litigation were brought to challenge the validity of absentee ballots. The
first challenge dealt with overseas ballots lacking postmarks, in contravention of Florida election law."1
The second area of dispute centered on absentee ballots received and counted in Seminole and Martin
counties. 2 The principal issue was whether these absentee ballots, which contained technical violations
of Florida election law, could still be in "substantialcompliance" with the law.53 Ultimately, the Florida
court4 allowed the ballots lacking postmarks to be counted as in "substantialcompliance" with Florida
5

law.

46

See Katz v. Election Canvassing Comm'n, No. CL 11302 AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000); Elkin v. LePore, No. CL 00-

10988 AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000); Gibbs v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. CL 00-11000 AR (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.

20, 2000).
47 In re Multiple Cases Involving the 2000 Presidential Election, Administrative Order No. 2.061-11/00 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13,

2000) (issuing order consolidating five of the Palm Beach cases).
48

Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. CL 00-10965 AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000), rev'd 772 So. 2d 1240

(Fla. Dec. 1, 2000). Critics of the lower court's decision argue that the "butterfly ballot" was illegal on two bases. First, the
punch slot to vote for Al Gore was third from the top, a change in the voting design which confused many voters into voting for
Buchanan (Florida election law circa 2000 specified that the candidate for president of the party that finished second in the last
governors race should be second on the ballot). The second basis of challenge was that the statute states that voting should be
indicated to the right of the candidate's name.
49 Id. For a lucid critique of the reasoning in Fladell, see Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis ofState andLocal Remedies for Election

Fraud:LearningFrom Florida'sPresidentialElection Debacle,63 U. PiTr. L. REv. 159 (2001).
50

Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 72 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2000) ("As a general rule, a court should not void

an election for ballot form defects unless such defects cause the ballot to be in substantial noncompliance with the statutory
election requirements .... [W]e conclude as a matter of law that the Palm Beach County ballot does not constitute substantial
noncompliance with the statutory requirements .
").
51

Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (N.D. Fla. 2000).

52

Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1793429 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000), affid, 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla.

2000); Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1793409 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000), afJ'd, 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla.
2000).
53

Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (N.D. Fla. 2000).

54 Id. at 1317 ("Election officials must diligently count every vote that substantially complies with a state's election law absent

any indication of fraud.").
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In the second area of absentee ballot litigation, a Seminole County lawsuit was filed to disqualify
4,700 ballots. 5 The suit alleged that the Seminole County election supervisor's office illegally allowed
Republican activists to fill in missing voter registration numbers on requests submitted by voters
requesting absentee ballots while not according such rights to Democratic supporters. 6 The issue then
became whether Florida's absentee voting laws required strict compliance with all their provisions or
whether substantial compliance could still make a ballot a legal vote for counting purposes.57 In response
to this issue, Judge Nikki Clark, a Democratic appointee, ruled in favor of the Republican defendants,
noting that any irregularities that were demonstrated did not taint the integrity of the voting and still
amounted to "substantial compliance., 58 Judge Terry Lewis (also a Democratic appointee) reached the
same conclusion in the Martin County case, which contained similar facts.59
Why did these Democrat-appointed judges uphold the counting of technically illegal absentee ballots
that would benefit the Republican candidate? It is significant to note that these judges were Democratic
appointees, since there were charges of a partisan judiciary in Florida. Some analysts, especially legal
realists, conclude that judges vote in accordance with their actual political leanings or personal views.6"
The judges in these absentee ballot cases cited the principle of "counting the votes" which underlies
Florida election law.6 Both trial courts held that these absentee votes, despite being technically illegal,
still substantiallycomplied with Florida election law. Furthermore, the intent of the voter could easily be
discerned despite the lack of a voter registration number (in the case of the Martin and Seminole County
controversies). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed these holdings.62
At the Election Forum held at the University of Florida Levin College of Law, Gore attorney David
Boies reflected that the Florida judiciary seemed nonpartisan.
If you look at Seminole County and Martin county, where it was the Democrats making the
challenges, you had the Florida courts turning them down. The Florida courts have taken a
long-term view that you count the votes and that you look for the intent of the voter. There are
these old cases that go back 80 years in which you had paper ballots and people were told,
"You've got to make an X in the box." They would do everything except place an X in the box.
They'd point an arrow. They'd underscore. They'd circle the name. They'd put an X on the
other side of the name. The Florida Supreme Court repeatedly said, "Look, you got to count the
vote." I think that the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida lower courts, generally, were
taking exactly the same view and it was really a nonpolitical, in a sense of nonpartisan
approach.63

55

Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1793429 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000).

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id. at *5.

59

Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1793409 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000), afid,773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000).

60

See Gerald P. Moran, Bush v. Gore: A Renaissance of Legal Realism, 2 FLA. COAsTAL L.J. 347 (2001).

61

See infra Part 111.

62

Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1793429 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000).

63

Election Forum, supra note 7 (remarks of David Boies).
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Determining substantial compliance was a central conclusion in the butterfly ballot and absentee
ballot litigation. The determination of compliance resulted in counting ballots in furtherance of the
principle of fulfilling the "will of the voter." When it came to the protest and contest phases of the
controversy, "will of the voter" proved to be the deciding issue in the Florida courts.

C. THE ELECTION PROTEST PHASE AND BUSH V. PALMBEACH COUNTY CANVASSING BOARD
Under section 102.166 of the Florida Statutes as it existed during the 2000 election, any candidate
had the right to protest the returns of the election as being erroneous by filing a sworn, written protest
with the appropriate canvassing board.
In the case vacated by Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard,' the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that since a recount was statutorily available, the certification deadline should not prevent it.65
The court observed that the certification date in Florida was quite close to the election, making timeconsuming recounts in large counties problematic. 66 The Florida Supreme Court also added a discussion
of the Florida Constitution's reference to the importance of the vote and the "will of the people."'67
Interestingly, the constitutional references became a point of controversy as to whether the court was
making new law or interpreting existing law in its opinion. The Florida court in its subsequent opinion in
the protest litigation indicated that it was interpreting the law and not making new law. 8
To implement its remedy, the court in Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard v. Harris used its
equitable power to extend the date for certification to allow manual recounts to continue. 9 In so doing,
the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended the federal safe harbor provision to be
a consideration in recounts in presidential elections." This conclusion was fateful since the U.S. Supreme
Court, in vacating the final appeal from the protest phase, focused on this finding in determining that
Florida law fixed a deadline that made the further recounts impossible."
D. THE ELECTION CONTEST PHASE AND BUSH V. GORE
The contest phase culminating in Bush v. Gore was the last stand for the Gore camp. The contest
phase was a very different and distinct process from the protest phase in that it allowed for a challenge of
the entire election and placed the controversy in the hands of a judge (here, Judge N. Sanders Sauls), who
was empowered to devise an appropriate remedy. It is extremely significant to note that some of Gore's
attorneys wanted to go to the contest phase immediately after November 7, rather than going through a
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protest phase.72 The result would have been to begin the counting under the contest standards sooner, and
the counts would have been directed by a judge rather than determined by local canvassing boards.
The canvassing boards created much controversy because of their various standards and approaches
during the protest phase. The protest recount was interrupted by demonstrations and provided the visual
image to the world of people peering through ballots to divine voter intent. If the recount had gone
straight to the judicially run contest phase, arguably, these demonstrations might have been averted.
The contest litigation focused on the standard necessary to initiate a statutory contest. Judge Sauls
concluded that the standard to initiate a recount of certified votes was a probability that the contest would
change the outcome of the election.73 Under this standard, Judge Sauls determined that the plaintiff failed
to show such a probability. In fact, the plaintiffs had put on very little evidence,74 in an effort to move the
case rapidly in order to meet the approaching deadline of December 12, 2000, the end of the "safe harbor"
prescribed in 3 U.S.C. § 5. A divided Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded Sauls' decision,
stating that the statutory standard was whether the circumstances would "place in doubt" the result of the
election under section 102.168(C). 75 In dissent, Chief Justice Wells wrote, "[t]o me, it is inescapable that
there is no practical way for the contest to continue for the good of this country and state."76
With what the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately described as a "standardless" recount in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, the recount was doomed.77 In retrospect, the only circumstance that could
have possibly changed the Florida result would have been a statutory standard for hand counting in effect
before November 7, 2000 that would have satisfied the U.S. Supreme Court. Hence, the recount
proceeded until halted by the U.S.
Supreme Court's restraining order.7 ' At that point, some of the Gore
79
lost.
had
they
that
felt
attorneys
Bush v. Gore contained several ironies. First, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Florida
statute on determining the intent of the voter-the very statute that could be considered the reason for the
inability to recount.8" Second, the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court could have set the standard
for recounting1 under that statute in response to the opinion declaring the recount procedures
"standardless."
The irony, of course, is the catch-22 of this holding. Any setting of standards by the
Florida Supreme Court would undoubtedly be considered a "change of law" under 3 U.S.C. § 5, coming
after the election date and breaching the standard set out by such federal law. Therefore, the Court's
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opinion clearly allows Florida to set its own election standard for recounts, but any change would have
resulted in losing the "safe harbor" under federal law. In other words, you can set your standard, but it
just will not work in this election-you have run out of time. Third, the Court found that the recount could
not continue because of the December 12 deadline, which was the next day.12 But, again ironically, the
Court preserved the state election prerogative by saying that the December 12 deadline was determinative
because the Florida Supreme Court had, in its November 21 opinion extending the protest count deadline,
previously concluded that the "safe harbor" was intended by the legislature to be part of Florida's election
law." Consequently, the contest ended with the U.S. Supreme Court concluding that the count could not
continue because of Florida law, not despite it. Evidently, a standardless recount violates the
Constitution, but clarifying the standards for the 2000 recount would have been unconstitutional as well.
E.

PERSPECTIVE ON THE FLORIDA LITIGATION: No WAY OUT

Ultimately, during the controversy of 2000, the State of Florida and its courts had no way out, given
the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion on equal protection. In other words, the conclusion that Florida
was standardless left no remedy available after November 7, 2000. Any recount would have been
standardless, and new standards would have created new laws, thus allowing Florida to drift out of the
safe harbor.
Was the U.S. Supreme Court decision political? Historically, the Court has not shied away from
high-profile policy decisions that have had a broad political impact. 4 Viewed in a narrow sense, this is
just a case reviewing state election laws. Justice Stevens in his Bush v. Gore dissent emphatically stated
that he believed the Court should not have taken the case.8" Put in a more general light, the decision could
be viewed as an effort to avoid the political turmoil of an extended controversy.86 The principle of the
Supreme Court's holding contrasts sharply with the philosophy of all deciding Florida courts. In the
butterfly ballot, the absentee ballot, protest, and contest cases, the Florida courts opted for a broad
interpretation that allowed more votes to count. By comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court found the
recount unconstitutional based on a lack of standards, a narrow interpretation allowing fewer votes to be
counted.
Was the Florida Supreme Court political? There were chargesthat the Florida Supreme Court was a
Democratic-leaning court because Democratic governors appointed six of the justices. Also, the press
reported that Gore attorney Dexter Douglass, who was Governor Lawton Chiles' general counsel, had
been directly involved in the appointments of six of the justices. However, attorneys familiar with the
court, including attorneys for Bush, believed strongly that the Florida Supreme Court would have decided
the case exactly the same way if Republicans had been seeking the recount.8 7 Nevertheless, the Florida
Supreme Court has become the subject of proposals ranging from limiting the terms ofjustices to making
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service on the Court an elected position. Opposition has already been announced for merit retention
elections in 2002.
The Florida voting process was inadequate to resolve the conflict that arose because of the lack of
standards and was flawed because of inadequate voting machines. Moves for reform began immediately
after the controversy. 8
IV. THE NEW FLORIDA ELECTION REFORM ACT OF 2001: HOW IT RESPONDS TO THE
MOST SEVERE PROBLEMS OF THE 2000 ELECTION
The legislature was anxious to respond comprehensively to the election crisis and proposed reforms.
On May 10, 2001, Governor Bush signed into law the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001.89 These
reforms will alleviate the problems seen throughout the 2000 litigation by eliminating antiquated voting
machines, setting specific recount standards, and clarifying voting procedures. The major classifications
of those reforms are as follows.
A. VOTING TECHNOLOGY: THE NEW FLORIDA STATUTE WILL IMPROVE BALLOTING ACCURACY

AND UNDERSTANDABILITY
Arguably, the major villain of the 2000 election was the punch card machine used in forty Florida
counties. The new Act decertifies punch card balloting and certifies touch screen systems.9" Reforms
require that better systems be used by local supervisors of elections, who are required by the Act to use
some form of electronic device.9 1 Since the Act's various reforms are costly, the legislature provided
additional funding for new systems.92 The new law provides that the Department of State review and
certify each system with each county.93 In the summer of 2002, Hillsborough County selected touch
screen voting.94 The Act also requires each precinct to use technology that can catch undervotes or
overvotes on individual ballots and allow the voter to correct those ballots.95 Through these measures, the
thorny problem of the punch card has been solved. The word "machine" is not even in the statute
anymore.
But has the state of Florida replaced one problem with another? Professor Richard K. Scher argues
that using new technology such as optical scanners will only confuse voters as much as the old punch
card system.96 However, assuming that proper voter education is successful, these systems will
dramatically reduce invalid votes and result in more individuals having their vote actually counted, which
is a definite improvement.
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B. THE NEW FLORIDA STATUTE INTENDS TO MAXIMIZE VOTER PARTICIPATION
Some citizens charged the existence of voter purges that wrongfully denied them their right.to vote.97
The new Act states that if it is unclear whether an individual is -eligible to vote, that voter shall cast a
provisional ballot, which will be counted as soon as the voter's eligibility is determined.9" This reform
allows anyone who comes to the polls to vote.
This measure should presumably eliminate the problem of voters-who were improperly purged in the
last election and were turned away from the polls. Under this change, the voter executes a provisional
ballot, even if he or she was not on the registration list.99 The ballot is later reviewed and counted if he or
she was properly registered in that precinct.' 0 This reform makes sense and would eliminate the
frustration of people who believe they are registered but are refused the right to vote.
Also, the Act creates a new section of the Election Code that provides for the development of a
statewide voter registration database.' °' This database will be maintained online and will contain voter
registration information from each of the sixty-seven supervisors of elections in the state. 12 Moreover,
the Act repeals section 98.0975, which called for the State to outsource maintenance of the voter
registration lists to a private entity 103 Arguably, tlus will stem the abuses concerning the overzealous
purging of registered voters.
C. THE NEW STATUTE WILL MINIMIZE VOTER MISTAKES

The Palm Beach butterfly ballot and-other evidence indicated that voters believed they voted
incorrectly Votes were also left uncounted as a result of undervotes-and overvotes. Some voters marked
their presidential ballots twice after an incorrect direction saying they must vote "on each page" of the
Duval County ballot.Y0'
The new Act seeks improvement by focusing on training poll workers. It creates an entire section
the supervisor of
specifically dedicated to poll worker recruitment and training. 5 The Act requires 10 that
6
elections ensure that poll workers have met certain mnmmum training requirements.
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Furthermore, the Department of State will review all proposed ballots. 7 The new Act also amends
section 101.151, defining in detail the specifications for ballots.0 8 This procedure seeks to avoid another
butterfly ballot fiasco and make ballots easier for voters to use.
Lastly, the legislation seeks to place some responsibility on the voter in a "Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities."'0 9 This provision has, incidentally, been challenged as a potentially intimidating
process analogous to an illegal "literacy test."'"l 0
D. THE STATUTE HAS BEEN IMPROVED TO MAKE IT MORE CONSISTENT, LOGICAL, AND ADEQUATE
The conflicting timeframes of the protest phase and election certification in the 2000 statutes have
been addressed. The certification takes longer, and recounts are automatic."' Moreover, the thorny issue
of determining the "clear intent" of the voter has been replaced with the determination of whether the
voter made "a definite choice."' 2 The Department of State shall enunciate what constitutes "a definite
choice," subject to certain qualifications." 3 This result will produce the uniform standards for recounts
that the U.S. Supreme Court found lacking.
The Department of State Specific will establish specific standards for each voting system. 1 4 Also,
requests for a manual recount in federal elections now go to the state Elections Canvassing Commission,
as opposed to each local canvassing board." 5
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108 Id.§ 7.
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the state. The Voter's Bill of Rights includes the right of each voter to:
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The Act also enumerates a list of voter responsibilities, which include obligations of each voter to:
(1) [s]tudy and know candidates and issues; (2) [k]eep his or her voter address current; (3) [t]o know his or her precinct
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The contest statute was also amended by the Florida legislature, though the changes here were
minimal. The new law omits the statutory language giving a circuit judge authority to fashion an
appropriate remedy as that judge sees fit.1 6 However, a circuit judge confronted with fraudulent votes or

other violations would have the general authority of all circuit judges to remedy a statutory violation.

E. THE NEW STATUTE IS IN TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE WITH ELECTION LAW STANDARDS
ESTABLISHED BY THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

Recall that with respect to the overseas absentee ballots and absentee ballots in Martin and Seminole
counties, the votes were ultimately accepted as "substantial compliance" with election laws. The response
to these issues was to specify standards for overseas ballots which are less restrictive and make them
easier to count." 7 The actual language allows electronic voting and reduces the information required for
an overseas ballot."' The new Act also eliminates the requirement of social security numbers or voter
19 Lastly, the new law requires placing the name of the party
identification numbers on absentee ballots.'
120
on the ballot next to the candidate's name.
Ironically, in the attempt to remedy the problem concerning absentee voting, the legislature may
have sown the seeds for future problems-especially that of fraud. Recently, the New York Times
performed a study showing that the Bush campaign successfully persuaded Florida officials to accept

hundreds of overseas absentee ballots that failed to comply technically with state election laws.121 Out of

2,490 overseas ballots that were deemed legal, i.e., as having substantially complied, the New York Times
found 680 questionable votes.12 2 Four out of five were accepted in counties that were carried by Bush in
an election decided by 537 votes.123
Making absentee voting "easier" may not be wise. Perhaps the standards and process of evaluating
absentee ballots should actually become more stringent, especially in light of the New York Times
study. 4 Eliminating the need for social security numbers and voter identification numbers, compounded
by using electronic mail balloting, creates the possibility of voter fraud.
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F. THE STATUTE PROVIDES FOR REFORMS THAT WILL MAKE THE ELECTION PROCESS APPEAR
MORE FAIR
The new Act calls for an inquiry by both the Division of Elections and the Florida State Association
of Supervisors of Elections into the feasibility of having uniform poll opening and closing times in
Florida.'25 One reform recommended by both Governor Bush's Task Force and the National Association
of State Legislatures was to ban state election officials from participating in a campaign unrelated to their
own. 126 However, the final legislation did not contain this reform, which would have signaled a
commitment to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE NEW ELECTION STATUTE WILL LIKELY PREVENT A FUTURE
CRISIS SUCH AS THE 2000 ELECTION LITIGATION IN FLORIDA

History and law professors will have much to say concerning the election of 2000 in Florida. Florida
laws were inadequate for this crisis and failed to consider the potential consequences of a dead heat
presidential election. Then again, many other states could likely have been in the same position with a
similar dead heat. Because there are thousands of overvotes that will never be counted and constant
disputes as to the recounts of the undervotes, we can never actually know how the election would have
come out if every person who sought to vote in Florida had had his or her vote counted.
The Florida legislature made a sincere effort to respond to perceived major problems. The problems
included inaccuracies in counting and inefficient machines. The focus of the reform is accuracy. Recall
that in 1876 the issue was a process that took too long to resolve; thus, the "safe harbor" was created with
time limitations to encourage a quicker resolution in presidential elections. Those solutions gave rise to
some of the complexities and problems in election 2000.
With machines that are more efficient, foreign ballots that are easier to count, and computers that
avoid human error, we most likely will increase the number of votes that will be counted. But we need to
remember that almost all solutions create new problems. All reformers and election officials should take
care that the efficiencies created by "voting systems" are carefully protected against fraud. Our wired
society has experienced the hardships and distractions from computer viruses and hackers. We should
take care that the computer hacker does not replace the old precinct ballot stuffer who fills out votes for
the dead. How much more massive could the problem be with a hacker affecting an entire system as
compared to fraud at one ballot box?
Would all of these reforms have changed the result of the election? Possibly. The sheer number of
additional votes counted with better voting systems would have changed the overall totals dramatically.
What would have happened under the new system if the vote had still been so close? First, the number of
ballots discarded, and thus in question, would be fewer. Under the new system, all ballots would be rerun
through the system. Then the validity and accuracy of the system is reviewed. Under a touch screen
system, remember there will be no direct physical evidence of the voters' intent. Any paper record will
be indirect, since the voter never had a direct contact with the ballot, such as by punching the hole or by
hand-marking the ballot.
If the system checks still revealed a close vote, then a recount would be required. We cannot know
if the totals would have yielded different results in the 2000 election. But if the new system had been in
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place, the margin for error would have been drastically reduced. Since far fewer votes would have been
discarded, the level of frustration and suspicion would probably have been reduced as well.
The likelihood of another Florida-like dispute is remote. As a culture, we hate mechanical failures.
Changing machines substantially reduces the probability that an election will occur in which numbers of
contested ballots will be so large as to place in doubt the entire election result. Nevertheless, after so
much speculating, the press and private recounts still seem to show that this election was within 2000
votes in Florida. No doubt an election that close, even with excellent machines or systems, would
generate a challenge by the losing party. However, new machines and new legal standards would likely
allow a quicker and perhaps quieter resolution of the controversy. We can only hope the struggles in
Florida translate into beneficial reforms for the entire country and that history will not repeat itself.
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